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An ‘option-pricing’ model is employed to analyse when a firm should 
expand  its  production  capabilities  abroad.  In  a  framework  where  the 
firm’s profits are determined by some average of the attractiveness of the 
home and foreign countries, and attractiveness in each country follows 
differentiated  Brownian  motions,  this  paper  derives  an  optimal  trigger 
value for FDI. The model shows that, contrary to the NPV rule, FDI entry 
should be optimally delayed the greater the uncertainty surrounding the 
future  path  of  attractiveness  in  both  locations.  The  second  part  of  the 
paper is devoted to empirically test the results of the model. Drawing on 
data  of  FDI  from  the  US  into  a  panel  of  developed  and  developing 
countries  and  using  labour  costs  as  a  proxy  for  (the  reciprocal  of) 
attractiveness, our estimation overwhelmingly confirms the results of the 
model,  namely  that  FDI  entry  events  are  negatively  related  to  the 
uncertainty surrounding attractiveness. 
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The surge of globalisation has presented multinational firms with new opportunities but 
also  tougher  challenges.  In  an  ever  faster  changing  market  environment,  the  optimal 
timing  for  expanding  abroad  becomes  of  utmost  relevance  for  firms  considering 
engaging in FDI. In that regard, this paper sets up a stochastic model that provides an 
optimal rule for the timing of FDI-entry and tests empirically the appropriateness of such 
optimal rule. 
The analysis of the timing of FDI has traditionally relied on the FRVWEHQHILWDQDO\VLV, 
according to which the firm should engage in FDI whenever the net present value (NPV) 
of  the  investment  is  non-negative.  However,  since  the  NPV  rule  is  oblivious  of  the 
irreversibility of most FDI projects and also of the uncertain nature of the payoff of such 
ventures, it is likely to provide flawed guidance as to the optimal timing of FDI-entry. In 
the real world, exchange rate volatility, price fluctuations, productivity changes, political 
instability, among others, render the outcome of any investment uncertain, so that a firm 
might have to wait for more information before optimally engaging in FDI, especially 
when investment costs cannot be fully recovered later on. Since in most cases the firm is 
not compelled to engage in FDI at any specific moment, it holds an option to invest 
abroad that should only be exercised when it is optimal to do so. The point is that in an 
context of uncertainty there is an opportunity cost associated with committing resources 
rather  than  waiting  for  new  information  so  that  the  present  value  of  the  investment 
payoffs must exceed the investment costs by the value of keeping the firm’s option to 
invest unexercised (Pindyck, 1988). 
Taking on board the high degree of irreversibility associated with most FDI ventures 
and also the uncertainty attached to the success of such ventures, this paper develops an   2
‘option-pricing’ model
1 with the intent of investigating when should a firm expand its 
production  capabilities  abroad.  The  firm  is  assumed  to  continuously  maximise 
intertemporal  utility,  which  depends  on  the  level  of  capital  invested  and  also  on  the 
attractiveness of the locations where the firm is installed. The attractiveness of the home 
and foreign countries, which is here understood to measure the location’s potential in 
generating profits, are assumed to follow differentiated Brownian motions. Letting the 
overall attractiveness to be determined by a geometric average of the attractiveness of the 
home and foreign countries weighted by the shares of capital committed to each location, 
the model sets out to derive the value of keeping the option of FDI alive. The main 
output of the model consists of a threshold that bisects the firm’s decision-making space 
into a zone where it is optimal to exercise the FDI option and a zone where the firm 
maximises its value by leaving the option unexercised, so that it becomes apparent when 
exactly should the firm engage in FDI. The results of the model suggest, among other 
things, that FDI-entry should take longer the higher the uncertainty regarding the future 
path of attractiveness in both locations. Moreover, we show that the theoretical results 
are empirically substantiated by our empirical results of United States MNEs’ FDI into a 
panel of developed and developing countries. 
The results derived in this paper are tuned in with the bulk of the empirical research 
undertaken recently on the role of uncertainty and irreversibility on the timing and extent 
of FDI. In fact, the recent FDI literature reveals that overall, empirical evidence points to 
a  general  negative  relation  between  entry  events  and  uncertainty.  Rivoli  and  Solario 
(1996)  argue  that  ownership  and  internalisation  advantages,  which  make  FDI  more 
irreversible, may be negatively related with entry events, as firms become more sceptical 
about  the  overall  success  of  the  venture.  Erramilli  and  D’Souza  (1995)  examined 
                                                 
1 This model applies the methodology developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to investment decisions 
under uncertainty and follows Strobel’s (1999) application of this particular methodology.   3
empirically the effects of uncertainty on the firms’ decision to engage in FDI instead of 
exporting or licensing to identify two contradictory effects of uncertainty on FDI. On one 
side, and as expected, uncertainty about the functioning of the firm’s specific market in 
the  host  country  discourages  FDI  in  detriment  of  alternative  modes  of  market-
penetration. On the other side, uncertainty makes the physical presence of the firm in the 
foreign market more valuable as it allows the firm to get a better grasp of the market’s 
characteristics  and  so  improve  its  overall  risk  management.  Campa  (1993)  tests  the 
effects that real exchange rate fluctuations had on FDI into the United States during the 
1980’s.  The  results  point  to  exchange  rate  volatility  being  negatively  related  to  the 
number of foreign firms entering the market. This negative effect is evident in industries 
with relatively high sunk investment costs in tangible and intangible assets. Goldberg 
(1990) finds a strong negative relation between long term exchange rate volatility and 
entry  events  during  both  the  1970s  and  the  1980s  in  the  United  States,  which  he 
attributes  to  high  risk-aversion  and  rising  costs.  However,  short-term  exchange  rate 
volatility is found to coincide with investment expansion, possibly reflecting increased 
short-term expected profits (Goldberg, 1990; Goldberg and Kolststad, 1994). 
In the context of the literature on the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility on FDI, 
this present paper not only develops an analytical framework based on the option-pricing 
theory that formalises the main empirical results in a rather general fashion, but also 
provides new empirical evidence. The use of ‘option-pricing’ models that capture the 
role  of  uncertainty  in  international  economics  issues  is  not  novel  as  it  has  been 
extensively applied to international trade theory since the mid-1980s. Some of the most 
influential  contributions  focused  on  providing  a  theoretical  argument  to  explain  the 
hysteretic effect that the large exchange rate swings of the 1980s had on trade prices and 
quantities. Foreign firms that entered the United States market during the first half of the   4
1980s, when the real value of the United States dollar was appreciating, could not exit 
when the United States dollar returned to its original level due to the sunk costs incurred. 
The exchange rate would have had to decline strictly below the level that triggered entry 
in order to induce firms to exit (Baldwin, 1988; Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 
1989a; 1989b). This particular episode illustrates once again the inappropriateness of the 
NPV rule in explaining events dominated by the uncertainty of the underlying variables. 
A crucial implication of the theoretical and empirical results established in this paper 
is that the NPV rule is blatantly misguiding in any context other than the unrealistic 
setting where sunk costs are negligible and there is certainty regarding the determinants 
of the profitability of the project to be undertaken. Under more realistic assumptions it 
becomes  immediately  apparent  that  a  positive  NPV  does  not  necessarily  render 
investment optimal since an unexpected turn of events may bring the NPV into negative 
territory in which case the firm has to choose between staying in business and sustaining 
negative profits or pulling-out of the market without fully making up for the sunk costs 
incurred. In other words, the higher the uncertainty regarding the profitability of the FDI 
initiative, that is, the more likely is a favourable situation to turn into an unfavourable 
one and vice-versa, the more the firm gains from waiting for more information before 
committing itself to investment (or dis-investment) whenever there are significant sunk 
costs. This result, which is a prediction of the “option-pricing” approach to the analysis 
of irreversible investment under uncertainty (Dixit, 1989a; 1989b; Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994) is formally derived in the present paper. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first part, a stochastic option-pricing 
model of FDI-entry is set up and solved and its results analysed. In the second part, the 
data and the estimation method are described and the empirical results discussed.   5
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Consider the problem of a firm whose production is located exclusively at home but is 
contemplating expanding its production capabilities abroad. The firm will engage in FDI 
only if such a move is deemed beneficial in the medium and long run. That in turn, will 
depend on the perceived evolution of the relative attractiveness as production sites and 
selling grounds of foreign countries candidates to host the foreign subsidiary of the home 
country’s firm. In that particular context, attractiveness is seen as a broad measure of 
return for the medium/long term, comprising indicators such as output growth, market 
size, costs of production and macroeconomic and political stability, as seen by the firm. 
This attractiveness concept applies to both domestic and foreign economies. 
Unlike other models of investment under uncertainty, such as that of Caballero and 
Pindyck (1992), the type of competition and other market functioning features need not 
to  be  specified  here,  since  prices  and  other  relevant  information  pertaining  to  the 
particular market setting are encapsulated in the attractiveness indicator. It follows that 
this  model’s  results  are  not  hostage  to  a  specific  market  setting.  The  attractiveness 
variable can be built such as to allow a measure of total profits (
~
P), highly correlated 
with actual total profits, to be given by
2: 
~
P W . W $ W 05 05 05 = ×  
Where  . and  $ denote the firm’s stock of capital and level of overall attractiveness as 
seen by the firm, respectively. In this model, the capital stock is determined optimally 
                                                 
2 Even though in reality the firm may consider factors other than profit, from the modelling standing point 
it seems fair to introduce the simplification according to which attractiveness is regarded as the foreign 
location’s  potential  in  generating  profits  per  unit  of  capital  invested  by  the  firm.  In  this  context, 
attractiveness  can  be  formalised  as  follows.  Actual  total  profits  are  given  by: 
P = - = - ( ) ( ) 5 & U [ [ F \ \
￿
￿ 1 1 ,..., ,..., , where R denotes the total revenues function and C, the total costs 
function. The profit per unit of capital invested is, p = - ( ) = ( ) 5 & . S [ [ \ \
￿
￿ 1 1 ,..., , ,..., . By defining the 















￿ = = ~ , , , , , p 1 1
￿
￿ , where i indexes the country, it follows 
that, since the function  () D
￿ ×  depends on the same variables as  () S × , it can be chosen so that  P  and 
~
P  are 
highly correlated.   6
through  the  maximisation  of  the  firm’s  utility  function,  whereas  attractiveness  is 
stochastic and follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
G$ $GW $G] = + a s ,  where  G] GW
￿ = e   is  the  increment  of  a  Wiener  process  and 
e
￿ LLG 1 ~ , 01 0 5,  (
￿
￿
￿ e e 1 6 = 0 for W V ¹ . 
Due to the uncertain nature of the outcome of any investment venture, the firm takes into 
consideration  the  fact  that  it  can  sustain  losses  at  any  time,  which  like  profits,  are 
increasing in the stock of capital, the only variable the firm has control over. Assuming 
that the firm is risk-averse
3, its instantaneous utility function can be written as: 
X . $ $ W . W U . W , 0 5 05 05 05 = -
1
2
2  (1) 
where  U measures the relative weight of the downside risk of investment and must be 
positive if the firm is risk-averse, as assumed. 
The first term on the RHS of equation (1) is a measure of profit, whereas the second 
term is a measure of risk. The fact that the second term is quadratic so that the utility 
function is concave in this second term just reflects the firm’s risk aversion attitude in the 
sense that the more capital the firm commits to the venture, the higher becomes the scope 
for losses. Hence, the bigger  U, or the more risk-averse investors are, the lower becomes 
the instantaneous utility derived by the firm from overall investment, including FDI. 
Since the firm can adjust its stock of capital according to the present realisation and 
future  expectations  of  attractiveness  (the  state  variable),  it  will  do  so  in  order  to 
maximise the following intertemporal utility function: 
8 $ ( $ . U . H G
￿
￿
￿ 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 = - % & '
( ) *
¥ - - I t t t t
m t 1
2
2   (2) 
where m is the time-discount rate. 
                                                 
3 In this context, risk-aversion means that the firm is more concerned with the downside than the upside 
risks of profits.   7
It turns out that the firm is an expected utility maximiser. However, notice that the 
measure of risk used is given by the square of capital rather than the variance of profits, 
as it usually appears in expected utility maximising problems. By doing this, we are 
deliberately assuming that the ‘risk of profit’ is a function of the scale of capital
4, since 
in effect it is the size of the project that determines the ‘size’ of risk. 
The solution to this Max problem requires solving the following Bellman equation: 








  (3) 
Applying Ito’s lemma, we can write equation (3) as: 



















2   (3a) 
Maximisation of the right-hand side of the above expression involves setting the stock of 





=   (4) 
Equation (4) implies that the optimal stock of capital varies positively with the level of 
contemporaneous attractiveness in a proportion inversely related to the degree of risk-
aversion.  Intuitively,  the  optimal  level  of  capital  increases  with  $ W 05  because  more 
capital boosts instantaneous total profits and decreases with  U, since additional capital 
raises the costs associated with the risk of future losses. Substituting (4) into (2) we get 
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m t   (5) 
                                                 
4 Since  .  is being determined endogenously and so is constant at any period t ,  ( ) [ ] . t
2
 is a measure of 
the scale of capital, not of its variance.   8
Bearing  in  mind  that  $ W 05  follows  a  geometric  Brownian  motion,  we  can  use  the 
properties of the lognormal distribution
5 to transform equation (5) into: 
8 $
$ W





2 2 2 m a s
  (6) 
provided that m a s - - > 2 0
2 , which will be assumed here to ensure the convergence of 
the integral in (5). Intuitively, this condition forces intertemporal utility to be bounded by 
imposing  the  time  preference  to  be  higher  than  the  rate  at  which  the  square  of 
attractiveness is expected to increase. 
8WLOLW\%HIRUHDQG$IWHU)',
Because the variables that determine the level of attractiveness behave differently from 
country to country, we must characterise attractiveness in the home country and in the 
potential host countries differently. Since there is no DSULRUL reason to believe that the 
attractiveness of any given country drifts away in a specific direction, we assume that 
irrespective of the country in question, attractiveness always follows a driftless stochastic 
process
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￿ ( G] G] GW , , ³ = 0 2 7  and  r is the correlation coefficient between the random 
shocks affecting attractiveness in the home and foreign countries. 
The  utility  of  the  firm  prior  to  engaging  in  FDI  can  be  derived  by  combining 
equations (6) and (7): 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Aitchison and Brown (1957). 
6The fact that we have eliminated the possibility that attractiveness contains a deterministic trend does not 
preclude attractiveness of a particular country from drifting persistently away from its unconditional mean 
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  (9) 
provided that m s - >
$2 0, which will be assumed here. 
Applying  Ito’s  lemma  to  8 $
%
#
% 1 6  and  ignoring  the  terms  of  order  GW 0 5
3
2  and  higher, 
gives: 









$ = + s s
2 2   (10) 
which means that 8
’  also follows a geometric Brownian motion. 
However,  once  the  firm  expands  its  production  to  a  foreign  country,  overall 
attractiveness, as seen by the firm, must be an average of both locations weighted by the 
share of capital assigned to each location: 







- 05 05 05 =   (11) 
where  $
.  denotes the overall attractiveness,  V
/  and  V
0  are the shares of capital employed 
at home and at the host country, respectively, with V V
1
2 + =1.  
Using Ito’s lemma it can be shown that the stochastic process followed by overall 
attractiveness,  $ W
305 is also a geometric Brownian motion: 
































rs s s s
2 2
2
2 7 2 7  (12) 
Combining equations (6), (11) and (12) we can determine that the firm’s utility after it 
has invested abroad as: 
8
$ W $ W
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  (13) 














C 2 4 0
2 2 2 2 2 7 , which will be assumed. 
Using  Ito’s  lemma,  we  can  confirm  that  8 W
E05  also  follows  a  geometric  Brownian 
motion:   10
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When the firm is producing exclusively in the home country its decision of whether or 
not to engage in FDI constitutes an optimal stopping problem for which the relevant 
Bellman equation is: 
, 8 8 0D[ 8 8
GW











  (15) 
where  , 8 8
M
N , 1 6  is  the  value  of  the  option  to  invest  in  a  foreign  country,  8 8
O
P -  
accounts for the expected discounted utility gain that results from opting for FDI and the 
second term in the curly brackets yields the time-discounted expected increment in the 
value of the option that ensues from keeping the option unexercised for an additional 
lapse of time,  GW. The range of values for which the second term in the curly brackets is 
greater than the first defines the continuation region, where it is optimal not to exercise 
the option. In this region the Bellman equation is given by: 
, 8 8
GW





O , , 1 6 1 6 =
1
m
  (16) 
Applying Ito’s lemma to (16) yields the partial differential equation that the function 
, 8 8
P
O , 1 6 must satisfy in the continuation region: 
  (17)
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The set of boundary conditions that applies to this optimal stopping problem is composed 
of a value-matching condition, 
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* * , 2 7
1 
The vector  8 8
_
‘ * * , 2 7 defines the boundary line that separates the  8 8
a
b , 1 6 space into a 
stopping region, where it is optimal to engage in FDI and a continuation region, where it 
is optimal to refrain from investing abroad. The derivation of the option value function 
, 8 8
c
d , 1 6  from  the  partial  differential  equation  (16)  and  the  corresponding  boundary 
conditions although possible
7 is unnecessary. Since the optimal choice regarding FDI 
depends exclusively on the relative value of the utility attained before and after FDI has 





0  we can impose homogeneity of degree one 
of  , 8 8
c , 0 1 6 in  8 8
c , 0 1 6
8, such that: 
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 =   (18) 
Such transformation allows us to re-write (16) as a function of X rather than  8 8
f , 0 1 6: 
2 2 1 2 1 2 4
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i L
2 0 2 7   (19) 
which turns out to be an ordinary differential equation. The corresponding boundary 
conditions becomes: 
L X X









2 7 2 7
- = -1 
Notice that equation (19) imposes a supplementary boundary condition: L 0 0 0 5 =  
                                                 
7 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.209-10). 
8 This solution strategy borrows from Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.210).   12
6ROXWLRQWRWKH2SWLPDO6WRSSLQJ3UREOHP
To  solve  the  optimal  stopping  problem  given  by  equation  (19)  and  the  respective 
boundary conditions, we must search for a solution and test its validity by substituting it 
into equation (19). Considering  L X %X 0 5 =
b, we find out that it constitutes a solution to 
(19) if and only if b is a root of the following quadratic equation: 






















j b s s rs s b s s r s s b 0 5 2 7 2 7 2 7 J L = + - + - - - - + + - 2 2 1 2 1 2 4
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
- - = m s
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2 0 2 7   (20) 
The roots of 4 b 0 5 can be shown to be equal to: 
b b
s s rs s m s
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2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 4 2 7 2 7 .  Since  for  - < < 1 1 r  
the coefficient of b
2 in (20) is positive, 4 b 0 5 is an upward-pointing parabola. Moreover, 













t 1 1 2 1 2 4
2 2 05 2 7 1 6 = - + - + - s s r s s m  and  4
u 0
2 0 5 = - s m  are 
both negative by previous assumptions
9, it follows that b1 1 >  and b 2 0 < . 
The general solution for equation (20) is then,  L X % X % X 0 5 = + 1 2
1 2 b b , which simplifies to 
L X % X 0 5 = 1
1 b , since  %2 0 =  in order to satisfy the boundary condition, L 0 0 0 5 = . 
Making  use  of  the  value-matching  and  smooth-pasting  conditions,  we  get  the 






















  (22) 
Now, since  b1 1 > , equation (21) implies that  X
* >1, meaning that the firm will only 
engage in FDI if the expected utility after investing abroad exceeds that attained when 
                                                 
9 See assumptions concerning equations (13) and (9).   13
production is exclusively carried out domestically. Put differently, contrary to what the 
NPV  principle  would  suggest  the  set  of  parameters’  values  for  which  the  firm  is 
indifferent  between  engaging  in,  and  abstaining  from,  FDI  yields  a  utility  after  FDI 
strictly greater than that associated with utility before FDI. In other words, when the 
outcome of the FDI venture is uncertain the firm is willing to take the risk associated 
with FDI if it expects to be strictly better-off than before. 
In order to obtain the critical value as a function of the ratio of the model’s state 
variables, i.e. the attractiveness before and after FDI, we use equations (9) and (13) to 
get: 
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2 4 2 7
  (23) 
With equation (21) and (23) we are now in position to derive the expression in terms of 
the ratio of the expected attractiveness after and before FDI that optimally triggers FDI: 
$
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*  it is optimal not to engage in FDI, conversely, 
if the value of the ratio is greater than the critical value, the firm should invest abroad. It 
follows  that  equation  (24)  defines  the  line  that  divides  the  $ $
￿
￿
￿ , 2 7  space  into  two 
regions: one where it is optimal to exercise the FDI option and another where it is not. 
In  order  to  do  some  comparative  statics  we  will  simplify  the  original  setup  and 
consider that s s s
￿
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  (25)   14
It follows from the above equation and the assumptions m s - >
2 0, that both bracketed 






*  above which the firm 
should optimally engage in FDI is greater than one. This means that the firm will only 
invest abroad if the attractiveness associated with FDI strictly exceeds that of a situation 
of  exclusive  home  production  and  that  is  due  to  uncertainty  of  the  future  path  of 
attractiveness. 







10 and  lim
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, the greater the volatility (i.e. the 
higher s ) the higher must be the foreign attractiveness relatively to the home country’s 
to make it optimal for the firm to invest abroad. The more correlated are the shocks 
affecting the attractiveness both at home and abroad, the less the FDI option is worth and 








11. The reason is that the more correlated shocks are, the more closely both 
attractivenesses move and so the lower the uncertainty that results from the switch from 
a situation where production is exclusively carried out at home to one where the firm 
extends its production facilities abroad. 
In regard to the discount rate, the greater is the firm’s time discount, the lower it 






*  that triggers optimal entry, 







11. This result stems from the fact that a higher time preference 
increases the firm’s opportunity cost of not immediately investing abroad. In the extreme 
case  where  the  firm  cares  only  about  the  present  moment,  so  that  m ® ¥,  then 
                                                 
10 Because the expression for the derivative is too long it is shown in Appendix.   15
lim
m b






* =1, so that uncertainty is disregarded and the value of the FDI option 
collapses to zero. 
Lastly, the higher the foreign share of the firm’s production, the higher must be the 









11  and  this 
ensues  from  the  fact  that  investment  expenditures  always  exhibit  some  degree  of 
irreversibility such that an increase in FDI raises the firm’s overall risk exposure. 
These results are extended for equation (24) using simulations (see figures 1-6 in 
Appendix). The simulations are performed against a benchmark case (see Appendix for 







*  with respect to the parameters of the model: s
￿ , s
￿ , r, m,  V
￿  and  V
￿ . 
The simulations carried out on the critical values of relative attractiveness confirm the 
results of the comparative statics discussed above. Figure 1 reveals that the trigger value 
is much more sensitive to s
￿  than to s
￿ . This is due to the fact that the higher the 
uncertainty in foreign locations, the higher the risk of foreign investments’ returns and so 
the higher must relative attractiveness be in order to trigger FDI-entry. Figure 2 shows 
that the trigger value rises when s
￿  is high and r moves toward minus 1, since such 
combinations entail the highest increase in uncertainty following FDI-entry. In figures 2 
and  5  note  that  the  dampening  influence  of  higher  r  and  m  on  the  critical  ratio 
strengthens as s
￿  increases. Figure 3 confirms that the more the firm has been investing 
abroad, the more exposed to foreign volatility it is, making the trigger value to increase. 
The accentuated curvature of the surface graphed in figure 4, in which the critical value 
of relative attractiveness rises very fast as both s
￿  and  V
￿  increase, indicates that the 
higher  is  the  firm’s  exposure  abroad  the  more  dominant  becomes  the  uncertainty   16
pertaining to the foreign location to the FDI decision. Finally, figure 6 shows that if 
home operations are subject to high uncertainty, the firm will invest abroad for high 
trigger values. When the firm already faces a considerable amount of uncertainty it needs 
to be compensated for engaging on yet another uncertain venture. 
Before  proceeding  to  the  empirical  application,  it  would  be  interesting  to 
ascertain, from any point within the continuation region, the likelihood that FDI-entry 
will become optimal in the future. In addition, under the circumstances in which future 
financial liberalisation is a certainty, it is important for the firm to know the expected 
time that will take until the decision of FDI-entry becomes optimal. 
Using  standard  properties  of  the  Brownian  motion  and  the  lognormal 
distribution
































 from any point inside the continuation 
region can be shown to be given by: 



































































































































































æ                                                                       (27) 
                                                 
11 See Dixit (1993, ch.6).   17
where  ( ) [ ]
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Equations (26) and (27) indicate that the probability and expected time for FDI-
entry to become optimal depend on the relative variability of attractiveness in the foreign 
location and at home. The higher is the variability of the home country’s attractiveness 





 diverges away from 
the threshold that triggers optimal FDI-entry, and so the lower the probability that FDI 
will ever become optimal. Similarly, the higher the differential between 
2
· s  and 
2
￿ s  the 





 away from the critical ratio become, and so, the more 
time is the system expected to take until hitting the threshold beyond which FDI-entry is 
optimal. 
FDI-entry will become optimal with certainty provided that 
2 2
¶
• s s >  and it is 





 and the lower 
2
¶ s . For the limiting case where 
2 2
¶
• s s = , even though the probability that the firm will engage in FDI in the future is 
one, the expected time for it to occur is infinite. The intuition behind these apparently 












  might  occur.  Thus,  since  the  probabilities  for  successfully  longer  hitting   18
times  do  not  fall  sufficiently  fast,  and  the  expectation,  which  is  the  average  of  the 
possible hitting times weighted by their respective probabilities, diverges
12. 





 has a negative drift, i.e. when 
2 2
”
» s s < , 
there is still a positive probability that FDI-entry will become optimal sometime in the 





 being drifting away 
from the critical ratio, there is the possibility that a combination of positive shocks might 
just bring the system towards the threshold barrier. However, the expected time for this 












drives the expectation into diverging. When 
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 will be hit 
in the future is decreasing in 
2
… s . This is because the lower 
2






 to zero, in which case the probability of the barrier being hit converges 
to one. 
In summary, the higher the relative volatility of attractiveness at home and in the 
foreign location, the more likely FDI-entry is to become optimal and the sooner it is 
expected to occur. Moreover, FDI activities become likelier and are expected sooner, the 












                                                 
12 This argument is presented in Dixit (1993, p.56).   19
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The  model  presented  gives  clear  indications  to  the  effects  of  the  uncertainty  of  the 
attractiveness of foreign locations on FDI. It predicts that the higher the volatility in 
foreign locations, s
‰ , and the share of foreign capital invested in a specific location, VKI , 
the more valuable the option to enter will be and so the fewer entry events we will 
observe. Conversely, the higher the attractiveness of the foreign relative to the home 
location,  DWI , the higher the discount factor and the higher the correlation between the 
foreign and home  attractiveness, the more entry events we would expect to observe. 
Thus, for empirical testing purposes the reduced form of the model can be written as 















m s r . However, since the proxy used here  for the  
attractiveness of the foreign location is labour cost (OF), we expect to observe that as the 
attractiveness variable rises or as labour costs go up, the fewer FDI-entry events will 
occur















m s r . 
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The data consists of a firm-level panel of United States FDI into 13 different industries 
of  12  different  countries  for  the  period  1988-1996
14.  The  countries  in  the  panel  are 
Canada  and  Mexico,  six  countries  of  the  European  Union  (France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Netherlands,  Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom)  and  the  Southeast  Asian  New  Tigers 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). The host countries were selected so as 
to produce a mix of the world’s three main economic regions and also to highlight the 
duality  between  developed  and  developing  countries.  In  addition  to  accounting  for 
around  60  percent  of  the  total  United  States  FDI,  this  sample  of  countries  also 
                                                 
13 In fact, labour costs proxy ‘unattractiveness’ rather than attractiveness. 
14 The data appendix includes a full explanation of each variable and its source.   20
accommodates a wide variety of cultures, income levels, organisation and infrastructures 
and degrees of economic and political stability. 
The attractiveness of foreign locations depends on several factors, such as prices, 
operating and fixed costs, culture, language, legal framework, among others. However, it 
seems to be the case that MNEs pay particular attention to operating costs, of which 
wage and non-wage labour costs are a crucial item. Moreover, labour costs also account 
for a significant part of the uncertainty inherent to any FDI venture, since from the parent 
company’s stand point, labour costs not only vary in response to changes in the local 
labour market but are also affected by other sources of uncertainty such as exchange rate 
fluctuations. Consequently, in this application wages per employee of foreign affiliate 
industry  are  used  to  proxy  for  the  attractiveness  of  foreign  locations.  The  data  are 
desegregated  into  13  different  industries
15.  Table  1  in  the  data  appendix  details  the 
industry classifications. 
Note that the need to choose a proxy for attractiveness implies ignoring many of the 
factors that affect attractiveness, but that is a limitation one must be ready to endure in 
any empirical application. Moreover, whilst labour costs have scarcely received attention 
in  the  related  literature,  the  importance  of  other  variables  deemed  relevant  for  the 
decision to engage in FDI under uncertainty has been tested in previous contributions. In 
particular, the linkage between exchange rate volatility and FDI has been the focus of 
many  studies,  of  which  Blonigen  (1997),  Campa  (1993),  Froot  and  Stein  (1991), 
Goldberg (1990) and Goldberg and Kolststad (1994) are good examples. 
The next step consists of finding a suitable measure for the United States MNEs’ 
                                                 
15  The  classification  is  based  on  the  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC),  Revision  2  (Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual, 1987).   21
engagement in foreign direct investment, that is, for FDI
16 entry. Ideally we would be 
using the difference between the number of enterprises that entered into and exited from 
foreign  locations,  but  such  information  is  not available  for  the  panel  under  analysis. 
However, by recognising that a positive capital outflow implies that total entries surpass 
total exits, we choose to use positive capital outflows as a measure of net entry events. In 
addition, for each such entry event, we analyse whether the number of employees in the 
foreign affiliate increased relatively to the previous year. This leads to three ordered 
categories: no entry ( )', = 0); entry with no increase in the number of employees in the 
foreign affiliate ( )', =1); and entry with increased employment in the foreign affiliate 
()', = 2).  The  introduction  of  the  additional  entry  category,  ( )', = 2),  reflects  the 
need to accommodate two separate issues. First, capital outflows do not necessarily have 
a one-to-one correspondence with real activities as they include all sorts of financial 
flows. Thus, the supplementary criterion enhances the accuracy of the proxy for FDI-
entry used here. Second, since attractiveness has been chosen to be proxied by labour 
costs, the additional employment criterion increases the robustness of the results. 
The variables s  and r embody the firms’ expectations of the future behaviour of the 
level of attractiveness of foreign locations candidates to host United States FDI. The 
variable  s   measures  the  idiosyncratic  shocks  to  labour  costs,  i.e.  industry-specific 
volatility, while r stands for the industry-specific correlation between the United States’ 
labour  costs  and  the  respective  level  in  the  foreign  location.  The  need  to  quantify 
expectational variables raises the difficult issue of specifying the assumption according 
to which expectations are formed. In the present framework, static expectations seems a 
                                                 
16 United States’ direct investment abroad is typically defined as the ownership or control, directly or 
indirectly, by one United States’ person of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated 
foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. Any 
United States investment abroad that is not direct investment by this definition was not covered by the 
BEA benchmark survey. 
   22
more  appropriate  hypothesis  as  it  turns  out  to be  more  coherent  with  the  theoretical 
treatment given to the dynamic behaviour of the attractiveness of foreign locations in the 
first part of the paper. On the other hand, forward-looking expectations, by implying that 
agents  are  able  to  successfully  guess  future  shocks  to  their  business  ventures  are 
somewhat unrealistic. Nevertheless, in order to enhance the generality of our empirical 
application, we test for two distinct models of expectations formation, namely, static 
expectations and forward-looking expectations. 
In  respect  to  the  former,  it  is  assumed  that  United  States  MNEs  base  their 
expectations on the past three-year performance of the attractiveness’ level of the foreign 
location. Therefore, for each period, s  and r are defined as the moving average of the 
standard  deviation  and  correlation,  respectively,  of  the  logarithm  of  labour  costs  at 
industry level of the previous three years (excluding the year under observation)
17. The 
latter consists of assuming that firms form their expectation according to the observed 
level of attractiveness of the foreign location three years ahead. In this case, s  and r are 
defined as the moving average of the standard deviation and correlation, respectively, of 
the logarithm of labour costs at industry level three years ahead. Consequently, under 
static expectations we will analyse the period between 1991 and 1996, whereas under the 
perfect foresight assumption the period under analysis is between 1989 and 1993. 
Ideally,  the  share  of  capital  invested  abroad  would  be  proxied  by  the  foreign 
affiliates’ assets held by United States parent companies. However, since data constraints 
preclude  us  from  isolating  the  affiliates’  assets  owned  by  United  States  parent 
companies, the share of total assets of United States foreign affiliates, industry of foreign 
affiliate  relative  to  the  total  assets  of  the  United  States  parent  company,  industry  of 
United States parent, is used to proxy for the share of capital invested in the foreign 
                                                 
17 Note that the moving average (MA) was chosen in order to smooth those series as they were found to be 
quite irregular. For the relative labour costs of each country, the MA is not applied since it has already 
been standardised to the United States attractiveness.   23
countries. Finally, for the discount factor we use the United States’ Treasury 5-year bond 
yield. 
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In  this  study,  the  dependent  variable  is  discrete  and  represented  by  a  three-ordered 








). When it takes the value one it indicates that the United States 
MNEs have invested in industry M of country L at time W and no employment increase has 
occurred; when it takes the value two it indicates that the United States MNEs have 
invested in industry  M of country  L at time  W and employment has increased, and zero 
otherwise: 
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, is an ordered variable characterising the United States 








  is  the  direct 









 is the number of employees of the United States affiliates in industry M of country 
L, at time W. 
Let the underlying response model be: 
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 is the foreign affiliates’ labour   24












 are the volatility 
and correlation, respectively, of the labour cost in industry M of country L, at time W. 
Let W be the matrix of explanatory variables and b the vector of coefficients, such that: 
: VKI OF = 1 | | | | | m s r  and b b b b b b b
Œ
= 0 1 2 3 4 5 . 











936  under  the  static 











780  under  forward-looking  expectations’ 
scenario.  Since  we  have  balanced  panel  data,  7
￿
￿   is  six  (1991-1996)  for  the  former 
scenario and five (1989-1993) for the latter, for all L and M. 








is  not  observable,  but  we  know  which  of  the  three  categories  it 
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￿   is  the  vector  of 




￿ .  Generally  the 
logistic and normal distributions are adopted
18. The logistic distribution is similar to the 
normal distribution, except for the tails, which are considerably heavier (see Cox, 1970). 
Contrary to the binary case, the similarity
19 between probit and logit no longer holds 
under  the  present  specification,  leading  to  very  distinct  inference  (see  Hsiao,  1986). 
                                                 


























19 For the similarity between binomial logit and probit models see Amenina (1981).   25
Moreover, the answer to the question of which distribution to use is very difficult to 
justify  on  theoretical  grounds  (Greene,  1993;  Baltagi,  1995;  Hsiao,  1986;  Maddala, 
1983). In this application, we present the results for the ordered probit and logit. Since 
we have panel data, we need to control for unobserved characteristics of the individuals, 
m
￿
￿ , in order to get a consistent estimator. 
(67,0$7,215(68/76
The results are presented for two separate cases. In the general case, it is only analysed 
whether entry occurs or not (see Table 1). The results for this case are presented for the 
fixed  effects  logit  model  and  random  effects  probit  model,  in  which  the  dependent 
variable is binary
20 under both the static expectations and forward-looking expectations’ 
hypotheses.  A  more  specific  case  where  entry  is  broken  down  into  two  different 
categories, entry without employment and entry with employment is then analysed using 
an ordered probit model. For the ordered probit model we also report the results under 
the  static  expectations’  hypothesis  and  forward-looking  expectations’  hypothesis  (see 
Table 2). 
Before describing the results, it must be noted that since we cannot assume that under 
the static-looking expectations’ hypothesis MNEs observe the current value of labour 
costs, we used the value of relative labour costs lagged one period, implying as it should 
in a context of static-looking expectations, that firms expect relative labour costs not to 
change  from the last period. On the other hand, under forward-looking expectations, 
MNEs are assumed to accurately forecast relative labour costs so that entry decisions are 
based on current values. 
                                                 
20 When it takes the value one it indicates that the United States’ MNE has invested in industry j of 
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) are used to signal overall entry events.   26
The results of the binary dependent variable model are presented in Table 1. Table 1 
is  arranged  into  two  main  sections,  the  first  is  composed  of  columns  (1)-(5),  which 
correspond  to  the  model  under  static-looking  expectations’  hypothesis  and  the  other 
composed  of  columns  (6)-(10),  which  correspond  to  the  model  under  the  forward-
looking  expectations’  hypothesis.  In  the  first  column  of  each  section,  the  maximum 
likelihood estimation’s (MLE) results for the standard logit model are presented whilst 
the second column reports the fixed effects logit model’s results. The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman’s (1978) test is not rejected, hence both the standard maximum likelihood 
logit  estimator  and  the  Chamberlain' s  (1980)  estimator  are  consistent,  but  the 
Chamberlain' s estimator is inefficient, under both expectations’ hypotheses. Finally, in 
the third and fourth columns of each section, the results of the binomial probit model and 
the random effects probit model
21 are presented. The marginal effects
22 of the random 
effects probit model are given in last columns of each section. 
As we may observe in Table 1, for both standard logit and probit models, the overall 
significance
23 of the regressors is not rejected at 1 percent significance level, under both 
expectations’  hypotheses.  The  random  effects  specification  is  also  not  rejected  at  6 
percent  under  the  static  expectations’  hypothesis  and  8  percent  under  the  forward-
looking expectations’ hypothesis. The coefficient estimates all have the correct signs, 
with the exception of the share of FDI (VKI ) variable. The best-fit model, as suggested by 
the measures of goodness of fit
24, appears to be the random effects probit model, under 
                                                 
21 See Buttler and Mofit, 1982, Hsiao, 1986 and Baltagi, 1995. 
22 The partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics are computed at the 
means of the exogenous variables using all observations. 
23 For testing the joint hypothesis that k slopes in the regression equal to zero we have the likelihood ratio 
statistic (LR), which follows a chi-square with k degrees of freedom (see Greene, 1993). 
24 As Maddala (1992) and Greene (1993) suggest we may think of the goodness fit of the model in terms 
of the proportion of the corrected predictions, resulting in the Pseudo and Naïve R-squares.   27
both expectations’ hypothesis with the highest likelihood ratio index (LRI)
25 and pseudo 
Zavoina and McKelvey (ZM) R-square






























































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 0.495 0.335 0.343 0.088 0.473 0.345 0.361 0.094
p-value  (0.542) (0.463) (0.468) (0.467) (0.367) (0.252) (0.227) (0.221)
Share of FDI 0.056 0.017 0.033 0.036 0.009 0.020 0.169 0.011 0.013 0.003
p-value  (0.148) (0.918) (0.130) (0.151) (0.153) (0.621) (0.318) (0.631) (0.627) (0.627)
Discount Rate 0.230 0.233 0.132 0.137 0.035 0.161 0.174 0.089 0.093 0.024
p-value  (0.068) (0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.024) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
Relative Labour Costs -0.622 0.320 -0.367 -0.377 -0.097 -0.406 0.663 -0.242 -0.251 -0.066
p-value  (0.002) (0.673) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.060) (0.473) (0.056) (0.063) (0.060)
Volatility -1.047 -0.851 -0.614 -0.609 -0.157 -0.810 -1.360 -0.509 -0.535 -0.140
p-value  (0.054) (0.317) (0.050) (0.091) (0.091) (0.216) (0.230) (0.179) (0.179) (0.174)
Correlation 0.034 -0.103 0.019 0.013 0.003 0.505 0.496 0.291 0.297 0.078
p-value  (0.788) (0.513) (0.787) (0.858) (0.858) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rho 0.076 0.083
p-value  (0.175) (0.190)
No. Observations 936 936 936 936 936 780 780 780 780 780
Log likelihood function -446.1 -233.6 -445.9 -444.1 -373.6 -175.1 -373.5 -372.0
Restricted log likelihood -453.9 -453.9 -445.9 -387.5 -387.5 -373.5
LR (Chi-square) 15.493 15.958 3.658 27.915 27.960 3.056
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 1 5 5 1
Significance (0.008) (0.007) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080)
LRI 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.036 0.036 0.040
Pseudo R-SQR 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.801 0.801 0.801
NAÏVE R-SQR 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.803 0.803 0.803
Pseudo ZM R-SQR 0.335 0.339 0.352 0.357
Hausman Test 3.226 3.478
Degrees of Freedom 5 5
Significance 0.665 0.627
i)  P-values corresponding to Maximum Likelihood Estimation are reported in parentheses.
ii) The Restricted log likelihood for the random effects probit model is for Rho=0  
The  results  of  the  random  effects  probit  model  under  the  static  expectations’ 
hypothesis (column 4) suggest a positive and significant coefficient at 6 percent for the 
United  States’  discount  rate  and  a  positive  but  not  significant  coefficient  for  the 
correlation  between  the  labour  cost  of  United  States  and  the  foreign  location  were 
obtained. A negative and highly significant coefficient for the relative labour costs and a 
negative and significant at 9 percent coefficient for the volatility that the United States’ 
investors face in the foreign location. However the coefficient estimate for the share of 
capital already invested in a specific industry of a specific country has not the expected 
                                                 
25 The LRI results from MacFadden (1974). 
26 See Zavoina and McKelvey (1975)   28
sign but it is not significantly different from zero. 
Under the hypothesis of static expectations the data predicts that, at the sample means 
(see column 5), the negative effect of variations in labour costs’ volatility, s , on the 
probability of United States’ entry is 0.157 whereas the positive effect of correlation, r, 
on the probability of entry is 0.003. Changes in relative labour costs, OF, affect negatively 
the  probability  of  entry  by  0.097,  and  the  discount  rate,  m,  affects  positively  the 
probability of entry by 0.035. Though not supported by the model’s predictions, in this 
econometric application the share of United States’ capital already invested in a specific 
country’s industry, VKI , affects positively the probability by 0.009. 
The  results  of  the  random  effects  probit  model,  under  the  forward-looking 
expectations’  hypothesis  (columns  9  and  10)  suggest  a  positive  and  significant 
coefficient at 2 percent for the United States’ discount rate and a positive and highly 
significant coefficient for the correlation between the labour cost of United States and the 
foreign location. The changes in these variables affect the probability of entry by 0.024 
and by 0.078, respectively. A negative and significant at 6 percent coefficient for the 
relative  labour  costs  and  a  negative  and  significant  at  17  percent  coefficient  for  the 
volatility that the United States’ investors face in the foreign location are found. The 
probability  of  entry  is  affected  negatively  by  variations  in  relative  labour  costs  and 
volatility in the foreign location by 0.06 and 0.14, respectively. However, the coefficient 
estimate for the share of capital already invested in a specific industry of  a specific 
country has not the expected sign but it is not significantly different from zero. 
Though statistically quite robust, the random effects probit model under the static-
looking  and  forward-looking  expectations’  hypotheses  does  not  suit  very  well  the 
predictions of the model as far as the share of capital invested is concerned. This could 
be due to the fact that the proxy for the attractiveness of the foreign location used in this   29
application is the labour cost per employee whilst entry is, in this case, solely defined by 
net capital outflows. Thus, it seems to be more sensible to define FDI-entry also in terms 
of  employment.  Therefore,  in  what  follows,  the  data  are  analysed  using  a  second 
criterion for entry, the United States affiliates number of employees (EM). This results in 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 0.463 -0.0680 -0.0455 0.1134 0.236 -0.0346 -0.0235 0.0581
p-value  (0.435) (0.573)
Share of FDI -0.001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.002 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0006
p-value  (0.956) (0.946)
Discount Rate 0.236 -0.0346 -0.0231 0.0577 0.221 -0.0324 -0.0220 0.0544
p-value  (0.009) (0.000)
Relative Labour Costs -0.414 0.0609 0.0407 -0.1016 -0.443 0.0650 0.0441 -0.1091
p-value  (0.010) (0.043)
Volatility -1.070 0.1572 0.1051 -0.2624 -0.939 0.1379 0.0935 -0.2315
p-value  (0.028) (0.134)
Correlation 0.048 -0.0071 -0.0048 0.0119 0.388 -0.0569 -0.0386 0.0955
p-value  (0.597) (0.000)
Mu(01) 1.803 1.764
p-value  (0.000) (0.000)
Rho 0.393 0.451
p-value (0.004) (0.002)
No. Observations 936 936 936 936 780 780 780 780
Log likelihood function -966.5 -793.6
Restricted log likelihood (Rho=0) -968.7 -796.0
Wald test (DF=5) 21.02 39.90
Significance (0.001) (0.000)
LR (Chi-square, DF=1) 4.44 4.85
Significance (0.035) (0.028)
LRI 0.012 0.029
Pseudo ZM R-SQR 0.727 0.758
i)  P-values corresponding to Maximum Likelihood Estimation are reported in parentheses.  
Table 2 presents the ML results concerning the ordered probit model with a logistic 
distribution (LD) of the original model under the static-looking expectations hypothesis 
(columns 1 to 4) and under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis (columns 5 to 
8). Under both hypotheses we do not reject the overall significance of the regressors with 
the Wald test and we do not reject the random effects specification with the LR test at 5 
percent significance. The pseudo ZM R-square is of 0.727 and 0.758 for the model under 
static  and  forward-looking  expectations’  hypotheses,  respectively.  Comparing  these   30
values  with  those  given  in  Table  1,  the  measure  of  goodness  of  fit  improves 
considerably, being twice that in the binomial model, which underscores the superiority 
of the ordered specification relative to binary one. 
The  ML  estimates  of  the  ordered  probit  model  under  both  expectations’  hypotheses 
suggest, as expected, a negative though not significant coefficient for the share of capital 
already invested in a specific country’s industry, a positive and significant coefficient for 
the United States’ discount rate, a positive and significant coefficient for the correlation 
between the labour cost of United States and the foreign location, under the forward-
looking  expectations’  hypothesis  but  not  significant  under  the  static-looking 
expectations’ hypothesis. We also found a negative and significant coefficient for the 
relative labour costs and a negative and significant coefficient for the volatility that the 
United States’ investors face in the foreign location, under static-looking expectations, 
but not significant under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis. 
In regard to the marginal effects displayed in the second to fourth columns of each 
section, notice that a constant had to be included in the regression to ensure that the 
marginal effects sum up to zero
27. Under both hypotheses we obtain similar marginal 
effects  for  the  United  States’  share  of  FDI,  discount  rate  and  relative  labour  costs’ 
variables. The probability of entry with employment (FDI=2) is affected negatively by 
the change in the share of FDI by around 0.0005, positively by variations in the discount 
rate by 0.05 and negatively by the relative labour costs by 0.1. On the other hand, the 
probability of no entry events (FDI=0) is affected positively by the share of FDI and the 
relative labour productivity and negatively by the discount rate by around 0.0003, 0.06 
and 0.03, respectively. 
                                                 
27 Note that, since the interpretation of the marginal effects concerning entry without employment, the 
third column of each section in Table 2, are ambiguous (see Greene, 1993), we concentrate the discussion 
on the signs of the changes in the probability of FDI=0 and FDI=2.   31
With respect to the variables that make up for the uncertainty in the model, namely 
volatility  and  correlation  of  labour  costs,  the  results  vary  with  the  two  expectations’ 
assumptions. Under static expectations’ hypothesis, the volatility of labour costs affects 
negatively the probability of entry with employment (FDI=2) by 0.26, and positively the 
probability of no entry (FDI=0) by 0.16. These estimated marginal effects are higher than 
under  the  forward-looking  expectations’  hypothesis,  which  stand  at  0.23  and  0.14, 
respectively. On the other hand, the effect of the correlation between the foreign location 
and United States’ labour costs appears to be higher under the forward-looking than the 
static expectations’ hypothesis. The correlation affects positively the probability of entry 
with  employment  (FDI=2)  by  0.09  under  forward-looking  expectations  and  by  0.01 
under static looking expectations’ hypothesis. On the other hand, it affects negatively the 
probability  of  no  entry  (FDI=0)  by  0.05  under  forward-looking  expectations  and  by 
0.007 under the static hypothesis. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  although  the  qualitative  response  of  entry  to  the  different 
explanatory variables is similar, the quantitative impact differs among the two different 
expectations’  formation  assumptions.  Such  discrepancy  is  explained  not  only  by 
differences in the specification of the respective equation, but also because the small 
period spanned by the data implies that the effective sample differs quite dramatically for 
the two alternative expectations’ models. Therefore, the quantitative results obtained for 
each specification do not lend themselves to comparison. Moreover, due to the quite 
contrasting underlying assumptions of both expectations’ hypotheses, the results must be 
interpreted in a different fashion. In fact, as opposed to the forward-looking hypothesis, 
volatility and correlation in the static expectations’ hypothesis translate into uncertainty. 
This follows from the fact that, first, the higher the underlying volatility of labour costs 
abroad,  the  more  volatile  that  variable  becomes  and  so  the  higher  the  uncertainty   32
associated with FDI-entry. Second, the lower the correlation between home and foreign 
labour costs the more volatile relative labour cost turns out to be and consequently the 
more uncertainty is faced by prospective foreign investors. Conversely, since under the 
forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis firms are assumed to accurately predict future 
movements of all variables, volatility and correlation do amount to variability but not 
uncertainty. It follows that uncertainty does not have any bearing on the decision-making 
of firms endowed with perfect foresight, but irreversibility still does. What can be drawn 
from the similarity of the qualitative results is that the predictions of the analytical model 
developed earlier are robust to both specifications. 
Although the data do not reject the forward-looking behaviour of the United States’ 
investors, the assumption of perfect foresight is at odds with the uncertain environment 
in which any investment decisions are taken. As a result, for the purpose of analysing the 
overall results (see Table 3), we will concentrate on the static expectations’ model. 
7$%/(6800$5< 5(68/76
6WDWLF([SHFWDWLRQV )RUZ DUG/RRNLQJ([SHFWDWLRQV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
/RJLW 3URELW 2UGHUHG /RJLW 3URELW 2UGHUHG
)L[HG 5DQGRP 3URELW )L[HG 5DQGRP 3URELW
(IIHFWV (IIHFWV /'0/( (IIHFWV (IIHFWV /'0/(
&RQVWDQW      +      +      +      +
6KDUHRI)',      +      +      -      +      +      -
'LVFRXQW5DWH      + (*)      + (*)      + (***)      + (**)      + (**)      + (***)
5HODWLYH/DERXU&RVWV      +      - (***)      - (***)      +      - (*)      - (**)
9RODWLOLW\      -      - (*)      - (**)      -      -      -
&RUUHODWLRQ      -      +      +      + (***)      + (***)      + (***)
Note: The symbol (***) denotes significance at 1% level, (**) at 5% and (*) at 10%  
The estimated negative effect of the share of FDI on entry, although not significantly 
different from zero, reflects the fact that the more capital a firm commits to its foreign 
operations, the more vulnerable it becomes to the uncertainty pertaining to the labour 
costs  of  the  foreign  locations.  The  result  by  which  the  discount  rate  affects  entry 
positively is in line with the stochastic model presented before, and is explained by the 
fact  that  a  higher  time-preference  raises  the  opportunity  cost  of  not  starting  reaping   33
immediately the proceeds of investment. The estimated negative relation between FDI-
entry and relative labour costs is a trivial outcome, however, the remarkable feature of 
the present results is the fact that the bearing of attractiveness on the probability of entry 
comes second to the impact of volatility. The relevance of such a result in the present 
context is that, by highlighting the importance of uncertainty on FDI decisions, it lends 
overwhelming support to the analytical framework proposed in the first part of the paper. 
Indeed, the estimated strong negative effect of  volatility on FDI suggests that in the 
presence of a positive degree of irreversibility of investment and uncertainty regarding 
future events, firms worry that gains may turn into losses, in which scenario pulling-out 
their investment could entail considerable costs. The fact that, in spite of having the 
correct sign the estimated correlation coefficient is statistically not significant suggests 
that, even though firms take uncertainty seriously, they do not care whether its coming 
from their domestic ventures or foreign ones. 
&21&/86,21
This paper presents an “option-pricing” model with the aim of analysing the optimal 
timing  and  probability  of  FDI-entry  in  a  context  of  uncertainty  and  irreversibility 
concerning FDI ventures. The results of our model reveal that optimal FDI-entry should 
take longer the higher the uncertainty regarding the future path of attractiveness in both 
locations  and  the  higher  the  share  of  capital  committed  by  the  firm  to  the  foreign 
location.  Conversely,  the  higher  the  level  of  foreign  attractiveness  relative  to  that  at 
home,  the  higher  the  discount  rate  and  correlation  between  attractiveness  in  both 
locations, the relatively sooner should the option of FDI be exercised. 
With the aim of empirically testing the ‘option-pricing’ model, a discrete-variable 
econometric model that uses labour cost as the proxy for (the reciprocal) of attractiveness 
is estimated for a 1990s sample of United States MNEs’ FDI into a panel of developed   34
and  developing  countries,  under  both  static  and  forward-looking  expectations 
hypotheses. The results of the econometric estimation suggest that the model can explain 
the  entry  events  of  United  States  FDI  under  the  hypotheses  of  static  and  forward 
expectations. Indeed, as predicted by the analytical model, FDI-entry depends negatively 
on the volatility of foreign locations’ attractiveness, on relative labour costs and on the 
share of capital already invested in that location. The entry of firms depends positively 
on the discount rate and on the correlation between the attractiveness of home and host 
countries. Thus, the overall empirical results, by suggesting that FDI-entry depends not 
only on the relative attractiveness but crucially on the uncertainty surrounding the future 
path of attractiveness, corroborate the implications of our analytical model.   35
$33(1',;
$&RPSDUDWLYH6WDWLFV
In this appendix the derivatives referred to in the main text are presented. The derivatives 
of  the  critical  ratio  with  respect  to  the  various  parameters  are  computed  taking  into 
consideration the assumptions made in the main text, which will prove instrumental in 
ascertaining the signs of some of the derivatives. To these assumptions, it is added for 
ease of calculations, that s s s
￿
– = = , which allows us to write equation (24) in the 
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As before, we decompose the derivation of the derivative expression into several steps: 
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The simulations relate to the critical ratio obtained in equation (24). These simulations 
are conducted with reference to a benchmark case. 
The values of the parameters considered in the Benchmark case, as well as the ranges 
used in the simulations of the critical ratio, were drawn from a panel data set of United 
States’ MNEs investing into some European Union Countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and UK), the Southeast Asian “New Tiger Countries” (Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  Thailand  and  Philippines)  and  into Canada  and  Mexico,  during  the period 
1992-1996.  The  attractiveness  of  the  foreign  country  is  proxied  by  the  labour 
productivity  (GDP  per  employee  per  hour,  US$),  from  the  World  Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY) for the period. Thus, the parameters pertaining to the equations of the 
critical ratio are defined as: 
6LJPDVolatility of Labour Productivity, is the standard deviation of the logarithm of 
labour productivity of the threes years prior to entry.   38
5KR   Correlation is the correlation between the logarithm of labour productivity of the 
foreign country relative to the United States of the threes years prior to entry. 
0X   The Discount Rate is the United States’ Treasury 5-year bond yield, from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
6KDUH  Since the data on the share of capital invested is not available, the benchmark 
value and the range of variation for both shares were picked arbitrarily according 
to what seems to be reasonably faithful to the underlying reality. 
The table below presents the range as well as the mean for each parameter according to 
the data set specification above. The mean values are used to define the benchmark case 
while the maximum and the minimum values bound the range used for the simulations of 
the critical ratio. 
  MEAN  MAXIMUM  MINIMUM 
Share H  0.9  0.99  0.51 
Share F  0.1  0.49  0.01 
Mu  6.116  6.690  5.140 
Sigma H  0.044  0.07  0.02 
Sigma F  0.123  0.959  0.01 

















































   
,3(752/(80  
Oil and gas extraction   Tobacco products  
Crude petroleum extraction (no refining) and natural gas   Textile products and apparel  
Oil and gas field services   Lumber, wood, furniture, and fixtures  
Petroleum and coal products   Paper and allied products  
Integrated petroleum refining and extraction   Printing and publishing  
Petroleum refining without extraction   Rubber products  
Petroleum and coal products, nec   Miscellaneous plastics products  
Petroleum wholesale trade   Glass products  
Other   Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic mineral products  
 Instruments and related products  
,0$18)$&785,1* Other  
   
,)RRGDQGNLQGUHGSURGXFWV ,:+2/(6$/(75$'(
Grain mill and bakery products   Durable goods  
Beverages   Nondurable goods  




,&KHPLFDOVDQGDOOLHGSURGXFWV Finance, except banking  
Industrial chemicals and synthetics   Insurance  
Drugs   Real estate  
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods   Holding companies  
Agricultural chemicals    
Chemical products, nec   ,6(59,&(6
 Hotels and other lodging places  
,3ULPDU\DQGIDEULFDWHGPHWDOV Business services  
Primary metal industries   Advertising  
Ferrous   Equipment rental (ex automotive and computers)  
Nonferrous   Computer and data processing services  
Fabricated metal products   Business services, nec  
 Automotive rental and leasing  
,0DFKLQHU\H[FHSWHOHFWULFDO Motion pictures, including television tape and film  
Farm and garden machinery   Health services  
Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery   Engineering, architectural, and surveying services  
Office and computing machines   Management and public relations services  
Other   Other  
   
,(OHFWULFDQGHOHFWURQLFHTXLSPHQW ,27+(5,1'8675,(6
Household appliances   Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  
Radio, television, and communication equipment   Mining  
Electronic components and accessories   Metal mining  
Electrical machinery, nec   Nonmetallic minerals  
 Construction  
,2WKHUPDQXIDFWXULQJ Transport  
Transport equipment (Motor vehicles and equipment   Communication and public utilities  
and Others)  Retail trade  
   41
'DWD6RXUFHV
&DSLWDO 2XWIORZV The source for the FDI capital outflows is the BEA. The direct 
investment capital outflows consist of equity capital outflows
28, reinvested earnings
29, 
and intercompany debt outflows
30. 
Direct  investment  capital  outflows  exclude  transactions  between  two  U.S.  persons, 
because  transactions  between  U.S.  persons  are  not  considered  international,  even  if 
cross-border  transactions  are  involved.  Thus,  if  one  U.S.  person  purchases  a  direct 
investment interest in a foreign affiliate from another U.S. person, the new owner will 
establish or increase its ownership interest in the foreign affiliate, but no equity capital 
outflow is recorded, because the transaction occurs entirely within the United States. In 
addition, there is no net increase in U.S. claims on foreign countries; instead, one U.S. 
person’s claims have merely been substituted for those of another.
(PSOR\PHQW The number of employees is defined as the full-time and part-time 
employees  on  the  payroll  at  the  end  of  fiscal  year
31,  extracted  from  the  Bureau  of 
economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States’ Commerce Department. 
6KDUHRI)', The share of total assets of United States’ foreign affiliates
32, industry 
of foreign affiliate relative to the total assets of the United States’ parent company
33, 
                                                 
28 Equity capital outflows are net increases in U.S. parents’ equity in their foreign affiliates. Equity capital 
inflows (decreases in equity) are netted against equity capital outflows (increases in equity) to derive the 
net outflow. 
29  Reinvested  earnings  of  foreign  affiliates  are  earnings  less  distributed  earnings.  Earnings  are  U.S. 
parents’ shares in the net income of their foreign affiliates after the provision for foreign income taxes. 
Note that, because reinvested earnings are not actually transferred to the U.S. parent, they increase the 
parent’s investment in its affiliate. Thus, an entry equal to the value of reinvested earnings is made in the 
direct investment income account, and a similar entry, but with the opposite sign, is made in the direct 
investment capital account. 
30 Intercompany debt outflows consist of the increase in U.S. parents’ net intercompany debt receivables 
from their foreign affiliates during the  year, as they are recorded in the financial records of the U.S. 
parents. 
31 An affiliate’s fiscal year is defined as the financial reporting year that ended in that calendar year. 
32 The foreign affiliates’ total assets are equal to the sum of total owners’ equity in affiliates held by both 
U.S. parents and all other persons and total liabilities owed by affiliates to both U.S. parents and all other 
persons. 
33 A U.S. parent is a U.S. person who has direct investment, that is, a 10 percent or more direct or indirect 
ownership interest in a foreign business enterprise.   42
industry of U.S. parent, from the Bureau of economic Analysis (BEA) of the United 
States’ Commerce Department. 
'LVFRXQW 5DWH  United  States’  Treasury  5-year  bond  yield  extracted  from  the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
5HODWLYH /DERXU &RVWV Labour costs of the countries in the panel relatively to the 
United States
34, during the period 1988 to 1996  
The  affiliates’  wages  per  employee  are  extracted  from  the  ratio  of  employment 
compensation  to  the  number  of  employees  in  industry  of  foreign  affiliate,  from  the 
Bureau of economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States’ Commerce Department. The 
employment compensation (wages and salaries per employee) data cover the full year. 
9RODWLOLW\  There  are  two  assumptions  on  the  calculation  of  this  variable.  (1)  Static 
expectations: calculated as the moving average of the standard deviation of the logarithm 
of host country’s labour costs, at industry level, from the three years (excluding the year 
under observation) prior to the date of entry. (2) Forward-looking expectations: defined 
as before but using the data for the three years (excluding the year under observation) 
after the entry occurred. 
&RUUHODWLRQ defined as the moving average of the correlation between the logarithm of 
host  country  and  United  Sates’  labour  costs,  at  industry  level,  following  the  criteria 
explained for volatility above. 
                                                 
34 The United States’ labour costs are proxied by the ratio of employment compensation to number of 
employees of U.S. parent companies, industry of parent.   43
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